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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ALLOTMENTS: Statute of Limitations
In United States v. Mottaz, 106 S. Ct. 2224 (1986), the United
States, in 1954, sold Ms. Mottaz's interests in three allotments
without her permission. In 1967, Mottaz was given a list of her
interest holdings by the Bureau of Indian Affairs that did not include the three allotments in question. After being given a second
list of holdings in 1981, Mottaz brought suit in federal district
court claiming damages equal to the current fair market value of
her holdings. Jurisdiction was claimed under
the General Allot2
ment Act of 1887' and the Tucker Acts.
The Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction for the claim must
be taken through the Quiet Title Act.3 The Court held that since
Mottaz was claiming damages at the current value, she is in fact
claiming a current interest in the land; thus the Tucker Act would
not apply.4 The Court also held that because a suit under the
General Allotment Act would result in a return of the land, to
allow such a suit would be to cause exactly the disruption that the
Quiet Title Act was intended to stop.5
Since Ms. Mottaz knew of an intent by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to sell the allotments in 1954 and since she was furnished
with a listing of her holdings in 1967, she was barred from bringing her claim because of the twelve-year statute of limitations in
the Quiet Title Act.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1982). Section 345 grants federal courts jurisdiction over
those proceedings involving the rights of Indians to allotments and those which involve
rights acquired after allotment.
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491 and 1505 (1982). Section 1491 says:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded either upon the constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.
Section 1505 allowed Indian tribes the right to sue for the same things contained in §
1491.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982), which grants jurisdiction in civil action to adjudicate a
disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest.
4. 106 S. Ct. at 2234.
5. Id. at 2232.

Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 63 (1986), reconsidered 10
Cl. Ct. 787 (1986), represented another chapter in the effort of
the allottees on the Quinault Indian Reservation to obtain
99
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damages for failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to properly
carry out its trust responsibility to manage the allottees' timber
resource.' In this chapter the government had filed for a partial
summary judgment to dismiss all claims that had accrued more
than six years prior to the commencement of the litigation, which
began in 1971.
The court held that testimony before various congressional
hearings showed that the allottees knew their timber resource was
not being managed properly at least as early as 1955. The plaintiffs wanted the court to utilize the "continuing wrong" tort rule,
which says where a wrong is continuous over time the running of
the statute of limitations does not begin until the wrong is
stopped. The court held that the rule did not apply in this case
because the claims were a series of individual wrongs, those of
which arose after 1965 were timely.2 The court granted the summary judgment as to those claims that arose before 1965.
Upon reconsideration, the court held that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs had a duty to replant every year and that failure to carry
out that duty represented a continuing series of actionable
wrongs. 3 Therefore, the allottees could sue for any damages stemming from those wrongs that occurred in the six years preceding
the filing of the original suit without regard to when the trees
were harvested.
1. See 445 U.S. 535 (1980); 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
2. 10 CI. Ct. at 73-77.
3. 10 CI. Ct. at 788-89.

CIVIL JURISDICTION: Public Law 280
In Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Engineering, 106 S. Ct. 2305 (1986), the Three Affiliated
Tribes brought suit in North Dakota state court to enforce the
terms of a contract between themselves and Wold Engineering.
The North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that North Dakota state
courts had no jurisdiction to hear any suit arising on an Indian
reservation because the state had waived all such jurisdiction
through state statute, except when sovereign immunity was
waived by the tribe. This waiver was purportedly passed by the
state in accordance with Public Law 280, as amended.'
1. Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended.
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The Court held that the state had lawfully assumed jurisdiction
of suits by Indians or Indian tribes against non-Indians prior to
passage of Public Law 280. Because Public Law 280 did not provide for the waiver of jurisdiction other than that which had been
assumed by the Act itself, such disclaimers were inconsistent with
the congressional plan embodied in Public Law 280 and thus were
preempted by the law.' The Court also held that the operation of
the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme was inconsistent with
federal law as shown by the fact that it imposes an undue burden
on federal and tribal interests in Indian self-government and
autonomy, as well as the federal interest in ensuring access to the
courts.' The judgment of the North Dakota Supreme Court was
reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with the Court's opinion.
2. 106 S. Ct. at 2309.
3. Id. at 2312.

CIVIL JURISDICTION: Tribal Sovereignty and Powers
In Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 149 Ariz.
524, 720 P.2d 499 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 578 (1986), the
plaintiff, a non-Indian materialman whose business was conducted off the White Mountain Apache Reservation, was suing
the surety of a tribal housing construction project because of
nonpayment of a private subcontractor. The case was initially
filed in federal district court, but was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was refiled in state court.
The defendant claimed the state courts did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because a suit against the surety was a suit
against the principal, and the principal possessed sovereign immunity from suit. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument because one exception to the normal rule is where the principal takes advantage of a personal defense. The court held that
sovereign immunity is such a defense because the tribe can waive
or not waive immunity.' The court held that the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case, where a non-Indian was suing a nonIndian entity, did not infringe upon the jurisdiction of the tribal
1.720 P.2d at 502.
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the plaintiff did not have standing to sue in tribal
courts because
2
courts.
The court found that because the tribe reached outside the
reservation to purchase supplies for its federally funded housing
project and because the plaintiff did not conduct his business on
the reservation, state court jurisdiction was proper. 3 The court
also concluded that as long as the state does not attempt to assert
jurisdiction over the tribe, there is no violation of the policy
against state infringement upon tribal self-government."
2. Id. at 503-04.
3. Id. at 506.
4. Id. at 508,

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Gambling
In Iowa Tribe of Indians of Kansas & Nebraska v. Kansas, 787
F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1986), the Iowa Tribe had been operating a
bingo game in an effort to raise money for the tribe. As a part of
their bingo game, the tribe also sold pull-tab cards. The Kansas
Attorney General decided that the state had no jurisdiction to
regulate bingo games, but decided that since the pull-tab cards
were considered gambling and illegal under Kansas law, the tribe
could be stopped from selling them. Faced with the threat of prosecution in state courts, the tribe filed for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court. The state counterclaimed for a
declaratory judgment, claiming that the Kansas Act' gave the
Kansas state courts jurisdiction over nonmajor crimes, which
would include the pull-tab cards.
The district court agreed with the state and ruled in the state's
favor. The district court also held that the Kansas Act gave the
state concurrent jurisdiction over major crimes. The circuit court
found that the wording of the Kansas Act did grant jurisdiction
to the state of Kansas over nonmajor crimes that would be concurrent with the jurisdiction given federal courts through the
Assimilative Crimes Act. 2 The court also held that state jurisdiction to prosecute the sale of pull-tab cards was not preempted by
the Indian Gambling Act' because (1) pull-tab cards are not
1. Kansas Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1982).
2. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
3. Indian Gambling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (1982).
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gambling devices as defined by the Act, and (2) with the narrow
definition of gambling devices, the gambling act cannot be considered to occupy the field. The court did not rule on whether
Kansas had concurrent jurisdiction over major crimes.
HUNTING, FISHING, TRAPPING AND GATHERING
RIGHTS: Eagle Protection
In United States v. Dion, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986), a member of the
Yankton Sioux Tribe was convicted of shooting four bald eagles
in violation of the Endangered Species Act' and for selling parts
of eagles in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act2 and the
Eagle Protection Act.3 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court convictions for illegal shooting of
eagles in violation of the Endangered Species Act.
The circuit court relied on an 1858 treaty that allowed the
members to hunt freely on the reservation.' The court reasoned
that since the Endangered Species Act did not specifically repeal
the 1858 treaty, the tribal members were still entitled to the protection of the treaty.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court decision as it pertained to the dismissal of the convictions. While the Court
recognized the precedent of only allowing abrogation of tribal
treaties by specific act of Congress, the Court nonetheless held
that the Eagle Protection Act abrogated Indian treaty rights to
hunt bald and golden eagles. The Court held that congressional
intent to do so was strongly suggested on the face of the Act.'
Thus, by authorizing a permit process by which Indians could
hunt and kill eagles, the Act prohibited any other taking.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982 and Supp 11 1983).
Migratory Bird Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (1982).
Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1982).
Treaty with the Yancton Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743.
106 S. Ct. at 2221.

MINERAL RIGHTS: Claims Against United States
In Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of FortPeck Reservation v, Board
of Oil & Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1986), the
tribes claimed the Secretary of Interior unlawfully delegated his
authority by entering into an agreement with the state of Montana. The agreement, signed by the Bureau of Land Management
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(BLM) on behalf of the Secretary, allowed the state to establish
field rules governing well spacing and location on the Fort Peck
Indian Reservation.
First addressing the question of waiver of sovereign immunity,
the circuit court held that the Administrative Procedures Act'
waives sovereign immunity for suits brought under 28 U.S.C. §
1362.2 The court then considered the district court's grant of a
motion to dismiss on behalf of the defendants. The circuit court
held that if the tribes' allegations of rote approval by the BLM of
state actions are true, then the BLM is not acting in accordance
with the strict standards of a fiduciary. 3 The circuit court reversed the district court decision and remanded the case to ascertain the true scope of the delegation of authority and to allow the
tribes the chance to prove their claim.
1. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
2. The purpose of this section was to give district courts jurisdiction over actions
that could have been brought by the United States as trustee, but which were not brought,
and to ensure jurisdiction would exist even though the then-existent amount in controversy requirement had not been met.
3. 792 F.2d at 783-96.

TERMINATION: Trade and Intercourse Act: Lands
In South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 106 S. Ct. 2039
(1986), the Catawba Tribe was attempting to have land returned
which supposedly had been sold to the state of South Carolina in
1840. The tribe was also seeking damages for trespass against the
approximately 27,000 people now residing on the land. The tribe
claimed that because the sale was not approved by the United
States, the sale was null and void. The Court relied on the wording of the Catawba Termination Act to make its decision.' Section 5 of that act revoked the tribe's constitution and made the
tribe and its members subject to state laws.
The Court did not reach the merits of the claim. The Court
held that the termination act was an explicit redefinition of the
relationship between the federal government and the tribe and required that the state statute of limitations be applied to the tribe's
claim.2 Therefore, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision and remanded for a determination of whether
the claim was barred by South Carolina's statute of limitations.
1. Catawba Indian Tribe Div. of Assets Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-38 (1982).
2. 106 S. Ct. at 2044.
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